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20.2.2024

Value-based pricing vs best price? Medicaid's best price problem

Medicaid’s launched its multiple best price program in July 2022 to address a major regulatory barrier to value-based drug pricing arrangements. Policy makers hope with this potential contracting risk and liability gone, manufacturers and healthcare payers will increase their participation in value-based drug pricing agreements.

 

In 1990, the Medicaid Prescription Drug Rebate Program (MDRP) was created to help slow the expenditures of outpatient prescription drugs to Medicaid patients. Under the MDRP, drug manufacturers who want their drugs covered by state-run Medicaid programs must sign a National Drug Rebate Agreement (NDRA) with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

The NDRA requires participating manufacturers to reveal the lowest available price of their products and pay rebates on their products. According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS), there are around 780 drug manufacturers with NDRAs currently in effect.

The rebates of the Medicaid Best Price Policy

Under the MDRP, manufacturers must inform CMS of the “best price” available for its products. Excluding the price negotiated with some government programs, manufacturers are required to report the lowest price it offers to any drug wholesaler, retail outlet, or healthcare provider. This best price is then used to calculate rebates. Manufacturers pay rebates quarterly to states for the drugs covered under state Medicaid programs.

The rebate for most brand name drugs (excluding certain clotting drugs and pediatric drugs) is 23.1% of the average manufacturer price (AMP) paid by wholesalers and retail pharmacies. If the difference between the AMP and the best price on the market is more than the AMP, then this percentage would become the rebate. The rebate amount for generic drugs does not include a best price provision and stands at 13%.

Outcome-based drug pricing can affect rebates

Despite the industry-wide push from stakeholders and policy makers towards value-based drug pricing arrangements, manufacturers have been wary of signing on to these agreements. They argue these outcomes-based pricing agreements could have unintended consequences that affect the AMP and best price. This, in turn, can skew the calculations for a manufacturer’s rebate liability.

In value-based drug pricing, a drug’s purchase price is linked to the effectiveness of the drug; if the drug underperforms, the manufacturer must pay a rebate, or other form of reimbursement, to the purchaser. Depending on the terms of the value-based pricing arrangement, this could be a substantial reimbursement to a payer for poor patient outcomes. The reduced price after the rebate–even if it’s paid on behalf of only one patient’s poor outcome–could become the new, lower best price.

The new Multiple Best Price policy

Before the multiple best price policy went into effect, manufacturers feared that, in theory, if the terms of a pricing agreement resulted in a 100% reimbursement to a payer for a drug proven to be ineffective, the manufacturer could find themselves in a situation where they had to give away their drug for free to every state Medicaid program.

In response to this interpretation of the best price policy–which became a regulatory barrier to value-based drug pricing arrangements–CMS revised the best price policy with the Final Rule. Under the Final Rule, as of July 2022, manufacturers can now report multiple best prices: the single best price for traditional sales and the prices negotiated under value-based pricing arrangements.

This option to report multiple best prices to CMS is only available for manufacturers who offer states the same terms negotiated in the value-based drug pricing arrangements with commercial insurances. State Medicaid programs can choose to take part in the value-based arrangements or continue to make purchases using the traditional best price.

Critique of the Multiple Best Price policy

Although CMS’ goal with the multiple best price policy was to reduce a significant regulatory barrier, this change still draws critics. And CMS has acknowledged that there will be implementation challenges. Here are some examples of criticisms of the new multiple best price policy.

• Critics find the Final Rule’s updated definition of a value-based drug pricing agreement to be too narrow or too broad. Before the Final Rule went into effect, organizations such as the Coalition for Affordable Prescription Drugs (CAPD) and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) were concerned the CMS definition of value-based contracting is too narrow and will exclude some value-based pricing arrangements that are already in effect or in negotiations.

By contrast, AARP worried there is a lack of clarity on the definition of value in the Final Rule that could lead to the designation of almost any drug purchasing agreement as a value-based agreement and open the door to fewer rebates for Medicaid programs and more revenue for manufacturers. Time will tell which is the real problem.

• There may not be a non-value-based price for a drug. If a manufacturer is not offering its product outside of a value-based pricing arrangement, there may not be a single, traditional best price to report. When there are no non-value-based sales to look at, CMS advises manufacturers to use reasonable assumptions to set a non-value-based price. Critics, of course, question the loose guidance of a “reasonable assumption” and see this as an opportunity for manufacturers to game the system.

Some stakeholders are also concerned manufacturers will shift most traditional sales contracts to value-based pricing arrangements with the goal of eliminating less profitable, non-value-based best prices. AARP and National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD) have warned that the new rule could undermine the MDRP best price policy that has been so successful in reducing Medicaid drug expenditures.

• There may be technological and operational barriers for State Medicaid programs who want to take part in value-based drug pricing agreements. Like NAMD and AARP, the National Organization for Rare Disorders (NORD) worries manufacturers could be working to erode the MDRP’s best price policy by providing better rebates to commercial insurance companies under value-based pricing arrangements.

Manufacturers and CMS know that some state Medicaid programs will not have the infrastructure needed to implement value-based pricing agreements with more favorable terms. In its Technical Guidance for using multiple best prices, CMS makes suggestions for creating alternative, innovative agreements when intensive data collection and analysis are not feasible.

The Lyfegen Solution

A lack of resources and staff prevents some state Medicaid programs from operationalizing value-based drug pricing arrangements. Lyfgen assesses an organization’s current data gathering capacity, then offers customized solutions using its contracting software platform to support the execution of value-based drug pricing arrangements.

Lyfegen’s Platform helps healthcare insurances, pharma, and medtech companies implement and scale value-based drug pricing contracts with greater efficiency and transparency. By collecting real-world data and using intelligent algorithms, the Lyfegen solution can provide valuable insights into drug performance and cost in value-based contracts.

Lyfegen helps increase affordability and access to healthcare treatments by enabling the shift away from volume-based and fee-for-service healthcare to value-based healthcare.

Contact us to learn more about Lyfegen’s software solutions and to book a demo.

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The Cost of Innovation: Budget Impact of Gene Therapy for Sickle Cell Disease on Medicaid Plans

In December 2023, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved two groundbreaking gene therapies for sickle cell disease (SCD), offering a new lease on life for individuals battling this severe condition. However, while these therapies bring significant clinical improvements, their cost has emerged as a formidable challenge, particularly for Medicaid, which covers approximately half of the 100,000 individuals in the U.S. with SCD.

The Financial Strain of Sickle Cell Disease on Medicaid

Gene therapy represents a revolutionary treatment for SCD, a condition that has traditionally required ongoing management through therapies like allogeneic hematopoietic stem cell transplants (HSCT). While HSCT offers a potential cure, its use has been limited due to donor availability and high toxicity. Now, gene therapy provides a much-needed alternative, but the steep price tags—approximately $2.29 million per treatment—pose a significant challenge for Medicaid programs across the country.

The latest budget impact analysis updates previous findings on how these high-cost therapies could impact 10 Medicaid plans with the highest prevalence of SCD. The study reveals that even cost-effective treatments with exceptional clinical benefits may be unaffordable for payers, particularly given the expanding Medicaid enrollment and higher-than-expected launch prices for these therapies.

Short-Term Costs vs. Long-Term Savings

For Medicaid plans, the financial challenge of gene therapy is primarily in the upfront, one-time cost of the treatment. The updated model projects that in the first year alone, gene therapy for SCD will result in an average budget impact of $65.8 million per state program, with a per-member per-month (PMPM) cost of $3.11 across the 10-state sample. Although the cost decreases over time—with the PMPM dropping to $2.08 by year five—the initial budgetary strain is a significant concern.

Despite these costs, the long-term benefits of gene therapy are undeniable. By offering a potentially curative solution, gene therapy could avert future medical expenses associated with SCD, such as hospitalizations, pain management, and ongoing treatments. The model conservatively assumes perfect effectiveness and durability, projecting that the therapy would eliminate all future SCD-related healthcare costs for treated patients. While these assumptions may not reflect real-world outcomes, they provide a glimpse into the potential for long-term savings.

Market Diffusion and Budgetary Impact

A critical factor influencing the budget impact is the market diffusion rate—the speed at which patients adopt the new therapy. The analysis assumes an annual diffusion rate of 7%, meaning that a subset of eligible Medicaid enrollees will receive the therapy each year. This rate could vary, influenced by factors such as manufacturing capacity, delivery center availability, and payer policies. Notably, if the diffusion rate falls below 4%, the PMPM cost could remain below the affordability benchmark set by prior high-cost treatments, such as sofosbuvir for hepatitis C, which generated a PMPM cost of $1.89 in 2024 dollars.

The model also reveals that 35% of Medicaid enrollees with SCD are expected to have a severe phenotype, defined by two or more severe pain episodes annually. This percentage is a key driver of cost, as patients with more severe disease are more likely to be eligible for gene therapy.

State Medicaid Plans Face Varying Impacts

The updated analysis highlights significant variability in how different state Medicaid plans will be affected. For example, in Georgia, where SCD prevalence is higher, the projected PMPM cost is $3.92 in the first year, while Florida faces a slightly lower cost of $2.50 PMPM. These variations reflect differences in both disease prevalence and state enrollment levels.

By the fifth year, the PMPM costs across all state programs are expected to decrease, driven by reduced new therapy adoption and the absence of ongoing SCD-related costs for treated patients. However, the affordability challenge remains a pressing concern, particularly in the early years of gene therapy adoption.

Balancing Access with Affordability

Medicaid plans, payers, and policymakers are now tasked with finding ways to balance the promise of gene therapies with their potential financial burden. The affordability challenge could limit patient access, echoing the struggles faced during the rollout of high-cost hepatitis C treatments.

One potential solution is the development of novel payment models, such as annuity-based approaches, which could spread the cost of gene therapy over several years, easing the immediate budgetary impact. Additionally, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation is exploring alternative payment strategies specifically for gene therapies within Medicaid, aiming to ensure access without jeopardizing the financial sustainability of state programs.

The Role of Technology in Managing Costs

As gene therapies become more prevalent, platforms like Lyfegen can play a key role in helping payers manage the financial complexities associated with these high-cost treatments. Lyfegen’s platform simplifies the process of tracking the economic impact of gene therapies, providing payers and providers with the tools they need to assess real-world outcomes, monitor costs, and adjust strategies accordingly. By leveraging technology, healthcare systems can better navigate the financial risks and ensure that patients continue to benefit from the latest innovations in care.

Unlock smarter budget management strategies with Lyfegen’s powerful tools! The Lyfegen Drug Contracting Simulator helps payers and healthcare providers model the financial impact of high-cost therapies like gene therapy for SCD, optimize payment strategies, and make informed decisions. Coupled with the Lyfegen Library’s extensive database of pricing models, you’ll be equipped to tackle the financial challenges posed by the latest innovations in healthcare.

Act Now – Book a demo of Lyfegen’s platform and discover how we can support your budgeting and contracting needs: https://www.lyfegen.com/demo

References

Meyer, K. B., Kilburg, M. M., Johnson, K. B., & Meyers, M. A. (2024). A budget impact analysis of gene therapy for sickle cell disease: an updated analysis. Blood Advances, 8(17), 4658–4666. https://ashpublications.org/bloodadvances/article/8/17/4658/517069/A-budget-impact-analysis-of-gene-therapy-for-sickle-cell-disease

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A new study investigated how drug rebates affect out-of-pocket costs for health plan beneficiaries. Rebates lower costs for payers, but depending on the health plan, they can raise costs for the patient.  

There is a lot of secrecy surrounding the final price paid for a drug at the pharmacy, as official data on drug prices does not factor in rebates or the end price for the patient. The rebates paid by manufacturers to pharmacy benefit managers is not publicly available. The study therefore sought out to understand the relationship between rebates and the prices paid by insurers and beneficiaries.  

Results: The negotiated price, defined as the price paid by the beneficiary at the pharmacy and by the payer after rebates are taken into account, rose 4.3% from 2007 to 2020. However, the out-of-pocket price, or that paid by the patient at the pharmacy, rose 5.8% annually. Retail pharmacy prices increased 9.1% annually.

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